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Abstract: System safety is of particular importance for many industries. Broadly speaking, it
refers to the state or objective of striving to sustainably ensure accident prevention through actions
on multiple safety levers (technical, organizational, and regulatory). While complementary to risk
analysis, it is distinct in one important way: risk analysis is anticipatory rationality examining the
possibility of adverse events (or accident scenarios), and the tools of risk analysis support and in
some cases quantify various aspects of this analysis effort. The end-objective of risk analysis is to
help identify and prioritize risks, inform risk management, and support risk communication. These
tools however do not provide design or operational guidelines and principles for eliminating or
mitigating risks. Such considerations fall within the purview of system safety.
In this work, we propose a set of five safety principles, which are domain-independent,
technologically agnostic, and broadly applicable across industries. While there is a proliferation of
detailed safety measures (tactics) in specific areas and industries, a synthesis of high-level safety
principles or strategies that are independent of any particular instantiation, and from which specific
safety measures can be derived or related to, has pedagogical value and fulfills an important role in
safety training and education. Such synthesis effort also supports creativity and technical ingenuity
in the workforce for deriving specific safety measures, and for implementing these principles and
handling specific local or new risks. Our set of safety principles includes: (1) the fail-safe principle;
(2) the safety margins principle; (3) the un-graduated response principle (under which we subsume
the traditional “inherently safe design” principle); (4) the defense-in-depth principle; and (5) the
observability-in-depth principle. We carefully examine each principle and provide examples that
illustrate their use and implementation. We relate these principles to the notions of hazard level,
accident sequence, and conditional probabilities of further hazard escalation or advancement of an
accident sequence. These principles are a useful addition to the intellectual toolkit of engineers,
decision-makers, and anyone interested in safety issues, and they provide helpful guidelines during
system design and risk management efforts.
Keywords: Safety principles; fail-safe; safety margins; defense-in-depth; observability-in-depth; system
safety.
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1. Introduction
In this work, we provide a synthesis of system safety principles, and we examine their
use and implementation in different settings. These high-level principles are domainindependent, technologically agnostic, and broadly applicable across various industries.
The objective of this synthesis is mainly educational, and it is meant to serve a useful role
in safety training and education. It can also support creativity and technical ingenuity in the
workforce to conceive and implement these principles in new or different ways to handle
specific local hazards, or new and emerging ones.
System safety is particularly important for many industries, such as the nuclear and the
airline industries, and broadly speaking, it refers to the state or objective of striving to
sustainably ensure accident prevention through actions on multiple safety levers, be they
technical, organizational, or regulatory.
Detailed safety measures abound for dealing with particular hazards, such as
electrocution and fire, for example. But the proliferation of safety measures in domainspecific areas is not conducive to adapting or devising safety measures to handle new or
emerging hazards, and more importantly it is not well suited for general safety education
and training of engineers and decision-makers. What is more useful for such audiences are
general safety principles and strategies, from which specific safety measures can be
derived or related to. The distinction between specific safety measures and general safety
principles is somewhat similar to that between tactics and strategy in a military context:
the former relates to specific moves and dispositions to achieve a local objective (e.g.,
moving soldiers and equipment, engaging in a skirmish or a battle), whereas the latter,
strategy, relates to broader considerations for planning and organizing to succeed in a
general conflict (e.g., war) with an opponent. More details on this distinction along with
several examples follow in the subsequent sections.
Considerations of system safety, and the related safety principles, while
complementary to risk analysis, are distinct in one important way: risk analysis is
anticipatory rationality examining the possibility of adverse events or accident scenarios,
and the tools of risk analysis support, and in some cases help quantify various aspects of
this analysis effort. Risk analysis has been described as addressing three main questions
(Apostolakis, 2004; Kaplan and Garrick, 1981):
(1) What can go wrong?
(2) How likely it is?
(3) What would be the consequences?

2

The end-objective of risk analysis is to help identify and prioritize risks, inform risk
management, and support risk communication. These tools however do not provide design
or operational guidelines or principles for eliminating or mitigating risks, and they are
mainly concerned with process1. Such considerations fall within the purview of system
safety. The safety principles examined in this work provide guidelines and conceptual
support during system design and operation for addressing the most important follow-up
question, namely:
(4) What are you going to do about it [what can go wrong]? Or how are you going to
defend against it?
Previous efforts at synthesizing safety principles include the works by Haddon (1980a,
1980b), Möller and Hansson (2008), Kletz (1978; 1998, and subsequent works), and Khan
and Amyotte (2003). The present article follows in the spirit of these works, and in some
cases it builds and expands on them. These works are briefly reviewed in Section 2.
Section 3 presents and examines the proposed set of safety principles. Section 4 concludes
this work.
2. Brief literature review of safety principles
2.1 Haddon’s safety principles and their energy-centric underpinning
Haddon’s work (1980a, 1980b) is a landmark in the study of the epidemiology of injury
and accident prevention 2 . It is grounded in the public health realm and conceptualizes
injury as an epidemiologic problem with agent(s), hosts, vectors (for the transmission of
injury-producing elements), and the environment (physical and social). Haddon’s
contributions build on previous work by Gibson (1964; first presented in 1961) in which
the agents of injury were first identified as various forms of energy—this idea is referred to
nowadays as the energy model of accidents (Saleh et al., 2010):
“Man […] responds to the flux of energies which surround him—[…] mechanical,
thermal, and chemical. Some limited fields and ranges of energy produce stimuli
1

They can help assess the effectiveness of a particular implementation of a safety principle once it has
been devised. The literature on risk analysis is extensive (the topic is not the focus of the present work). The
reader interested in a good introduction to risk analysis and management may consult the excellent works by
Kaplan and Garrick (1981), Pate-Cornell (1997), Rasmussen (1997) and the ISO 31000 (2009) and ISO
31010 (2009) standards.
2
Rivara et al. (2001) consider an earlier work by Haddon et al. published in 1964 and entitled Accident
Research: Methods and Approaches as “one of the most important milestones in the development of injury
research” worldwide.
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for the sense organs; others induce physiological adjustments; still others produce
injuries. […] Injuries to a living organism can be produced only by some energy
interchange.” (Gibson, 1964)
Haddon expanded on this energy basis of injuries, and the safety strategies he devised are
fundamentally tied to this perspective:
“A major class of [adverse] phenomena involves the transfer of energy in such
ways and amounts, and at such rapid rates that inanimate and animate structures
are damaged. The harmful interactions with people and properties of […]
projectiles, moving vehicles, ionizing radiation, conflagrations […] illustrate this
class of phenomena.” (Haddon, 1980a; quote from earlier work by Haddon)
Haddon’s development of the energy model led him to propose a set of safety strategies to
guide the development of injury control mechanisms and safety interventions. The
distinction between a safety strategy and a safety tactic/measure, previously noted, is
important to keep in mind, and to be able to appreciate the distinctive contribution of
Haddon. A safety strategy can be implemented in a variety of ways and measures, and
domain-specific knowledge is required, e.g., design and operation of a splitter tower at a
refinery, as well as creativity and technical ingenuity to translate a safety principle into a
specific safety measure (examples are provided hereafter and further discussed in Section
3). Haddon’s safety strategies include the following:
i.
ii.
iii.

iv.
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Reduce the amount of hazard/energy brought into being in the first place (e.g.,
reduce speed of vehicles in the context of traffic safety);
Modify or reduce the rate of release of hazard/energy from its source (e.g.,
shutoff valves, nuclear reactor control rod);
Separate in time and space the energy source (hazard) from that which is to be
protected; eliminate the intersections of hazard/energy and susceptible structure
or individuals (Haddon argues that the use of sidewalks and phasing of
pedestrian and vehicle traffic is one example of the implementation of this
strategy; other examples include the more common use of physical barriers to
separate hazard sources from individuals). This principle was described as
preventing the etiological agent, the energy source, from reaching the
susceptible host;
Make what is to be protected more resistant to damage from the hazard/energy
(e.g., make structures more fire- and earthquake-resistant3; Runyam (2003) in
discussing Haddon’s principles provide the example of a bullet-proof garment

How to do this would be an example of a specific safety measure.
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as an example of the implementation of this principle for dealing with injuries
from handguns).
A detailed discussion of these principles can be found in Haddon (1980a, 1980b). These
principles remain according to Runyan (2003) “an excellent brainstorming tool for
developing ideas about a range” of possible safety interventions. Haddon’s principles can
be found in Section 3, subsumed in part under the un-graduated response and the defensein-depth principles, although expressed differently and tailored toward system accidents.
2.2 Möller and Hansson synthesis of safety principles and the reduction of risk and
uncertainty
Möller and Hansson (2008) provided a much needed recent synthesis of engineering safety
principles. The authors recognized that despite the importance of the topic, “there is a lack
of general accounts of safety principles [in] the literature. The treatment is normally
piecemeal, focusing only on specific [safety measures]” or methodological issues in
probabilistic risk analysis (these topics are important, but they are downstream of the
concerns with safety principles, as mentioned previously).
The authors provided a list of 24 safety principles and subsumed them under four broad
categories: (1) inherently safe design; (2) safety reserves; (3) safe fail; and (4) procedural
safeguards. Although the authors did not acknowledge an energy basis of accidents, they
related their safety principles to an important aspect, namely the probabilistic
consequences of the implementation of said principles. To this effect, the authors argued,
and provided ample examples, that the end-objective of any safety principle is “not only to
reduce the probabilities of negative events that have been foreseen and for which
probability estimates have been provided, but also [to reduce] epistemic uncertainty.”
The distinction between Möller and Hansson’s view and Haddon’s is worth highlighting:
in recognizing the energy basis of accidents, Haddon identified safety principles that are
meant to limit or contain uncontrolled releases of energy, and to segregate in time and
space energy sources from that which is to be protected. Möller and Hansson (2008)
synthesized their safety principles under the various means by which they reduce risk
and/or uncertainty. Both views are important and complementary, and while the former is
content-centric and allows some creativity in deriving novel safety measures (safety
principles relate to the handling of energy sources and releases), the latter highlights
process-centric issues and ways for evaluating safety measures (safety principles relate to
ways for reducing risks and/or uncertainties about accident occurrence).
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One limitation in Möller and Hansson’s work is that several themes described as safety
principles are not principles, but specific safety measures in some cases, and too vague
categories to be meaningful principles in other cases. For example, the authors list timed
replacement, procedural safeguards, and redundancy as safety principles. They are not:
timed replacement for instance is one maintenance technique (among many others);
procedural safeguards is a broad descriptive term that is difficult to translate into an actual
safety principle; and redundancy4 is more akin to a specific reliability-improvement tactic,
but it can backfire through common-cause failure (Hoepfer et al., 2009). As such,
redundancy, while an important consideration for engineers, cannot be taken as an
unquestionable or always-dependable safety measure. We revisit some of these
considerations in more detail in Section 3.
2.3. Kletz’s inherent safety design principle and its pillars
Kletz first outlined the basis of the inherent safety design principle in 1978 in an article
titled, “What you don’t have, can’t leak”. The work was based on the author’s experience
with the chemical industry, and the principle was later further extended by the author
(Kletz, 1998), as well as by others, for example Kletz and Amyotte (2010) and Khan and
Amyotte (2003).
The motivation for this principle came from a simple observation:
“If we could design our plants so that they use safer raw materials and
intermediates, or not so much hazardous ones, or use hazardous ones at lower
temperatures and pressures, then we would avoid, rather [than have to] solve our
[safety] problems. Such plants can be described as [inherently] safe.” (Kletz,
1978)
Kletz later formulated the inherent safety principle succinctly as one that guides the
development of inherently safer designs:
“An inherently safer design is one that avoids hazards instead of controlling them,
particularly by removing or reducing the amount of hazardous material in the plant
or the number of hazardous operations. […] The words “inherently safer” imply
that the plant or operation is safer because of its very nature, and not because
[protective] equipment has been added on to make it safer.” (Kletz, 1998)
4

“Redundancy in design is the duplication (or more) of particular components of a system for the purpose of
increasing the overall system reliability. Redundancy in effect seeks to: (1) limit the impact of a single
component with low reliability on the overall system reliability; (2) improve the reliability of a critical
component in the system; and it does so by creating a virtual equivalent component of greater reliability than
the single component in question.” (Hoepfer et al., 2009).
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The initial formulation (1978) referred to “intrinsically” safe plants, in contrast to
“extrinsically” safe plants in which hazards were controlled by “extrinsic” protective
equipment and safety features, instead of “intrinsically” safer processes. This distinction
however was not maintained in other works by the author and others, and Kletz later
replaced “intrinsically” with the now more common expression “inherently” safe.
Note that the inherent safety design principle is also discussed in Möller and Hansson
(2008) as a broad category under which several safety principles are subsumed. The
authors explain that this principle entails “that potential hazards are excluded, not just
enclosed or otherwise coped with. [For example] fireproof material are used instead of
inflammable ones […] and this is superior to using inflammable material but keeping
temperatures low.”
Kletz further developed the inherent safety design principle and identified several pillars
for ways of achieving it. These pillars include what the author refers to as intensification,
substitution, and attenuation. Table 1 provides a brief description of these and other pillars
of the inherent safety principle. The reader interested in more details is referred to Kletz
and Amyotte (2010), Goraya et al., (2004), Khan and Amyotte (2003), and Bollinger and
Crowl (1997).
Table 1. Pillars of the inherent safety design principle. Adapted form Kletz and Amyotte (2010) and
Khan and Amyotte (2003)

Principle

Description

Process Intensification (PI) and minimization

Use smaller quantities of hazardous material
and/or perform a hazardous procedure as few
times as possible
Replace hazardous materials/processes with
safer ones
Use hazardous materials in their least hazardous
forms and/or operate the system at comparably
safer operating conditions
Opt for changes in the process design with less
severe effects
Avoid complexities in the process design and
eliminate excessive use of add-on safety
features and protective devices

Substitution
Attenuation

Limitation of Effects
Simplification

A careful examination of the entries in Table 1 shows similarities between the pillars of the
inherent safety principle and Haddon’s safety strategies. For example, the reduction of the
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amount of energy contained in the process closely resembles Intensification, and the
reduction of the rate of release of energy is similar to Attenuation.
The difference in framing various (overlapping) safety principles by different authors is
unsurprising, and it reflects to some extent their particular background and interests.
Kletz’s work, for example, as noted previously, is grounded in the chemical industry, and
is best understood and readily applicable in that industry. It remains nonetheless relevant
for other hazardous industries. The inherent safety design principle and its pillars will be
subsumed in part under the un-graduated response principle in Section 3.
2.4. Managerial and organizational safety principles or guidelines
Although beyond the scope of the present work (with its engineering focus on safety
principles), it is worth noting that an important literature exists and addresses
organizational safety principles or guidelines. The literature covers what is knows as High
Reliability Organizations (HRO), and it empirically examines what successful
organizations do—how they organize and manage hazardous systems and processes—to
promote and ensure system safety. The reader interested in this line of inquiry is referred to
the excellent work by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) for a synthesis of the HRO literature.
3. System safety principles
Our proposed set of safety principles follows in the spirit of the works discussed in
Section 2, and in some cases it builds and expands on them. The principles are first
presented at some level of abstraction, which leaves them domain-independent and broadly
applicable across industries. Then some of their practical aspects are highlighted and
examples are provided to illustrate their implementation in specific contexts.
We relate our safety principles to the notions of hazard level, accident sequence, and
conditional probabilities (of further hazard escalation or advancement of an accident
sequence). Note that while we provide some simple formal representations of these safety
principles and their consequences using probability notation and the Discrete Event
Systems (DES) formalism5, these representations are not necessary for the comprehension
of the principles. The reader not familiar with such formalisms may skip the equations, and
this will not compromise in any way his or her understanding of the safety principles.

5

Formal representation can provide additional precision in defining the safety principles and their
consequences (beyond a textual description).
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The notions of accident sequence and hazard level, which are briefly reviewed next, can
help further illuminate the purpose and consequences of these principles as will be seen
shortly.
3.1 Background information: accident sequence and hazard level
An accident sequence can be represented in the form of an event tree, starting with an offnominal initiating event and terminating in the accident state—the uncontrolled release of
energy and its consequences. For example, Figure 1 shows a simplified version of an Event
Tree Analysis for a generic nuclear reactor. The initiating event here considered is the
break of the main coolant pipe.

Pump1

Nominal coolant

Emergency coolant

Reactor

Main coolant pipe

Flow
detector (D)

Pump2

Electric power (EP)

Electric power

Electric power

Detector

Pump 1

P(p2)

Pump2
operates

Successful
prevention

Q(p2)

Pump2
fails

Degradation

P(p2)

Pump2
operates

Degradation

Q(p2)

Pump2
fails

Explosion

P(p1)

P(EP)

P(break)

P(D)

Pump1
operates

Detector
operates

Q(p1)
Pump1
fails

Electric power
available

Q(D)

Consequences

Pump 2

Explosion

Detector fails

Explosion
Q(EP)
Electric power fails

Figure 1. Simplified Event Tree Analysis for a reactor following the break of main coolant pipe (the
initiating event). P = probability of success; Q = 1 – P = probability of failure. Adapted from Billington
and Allan (1992).

The event tree reads from left to right. For example, in the path leading to the fourth
consequence from the top (explosion), we have the following events: the main coolant pipe
breaks; electric power is available upon demand to support the activation of the flow
detector and emergency pumps; the flow detector operates properly and detects loss of
9

main coolant; information is conveyed to activate redundant emergency pumps; pump 1
fails to activate; pump 2 also fails to activate, and this sequence of events leads to the
explosion. The event tree can be further expanded to examine more possibilities and add
further resolution to the consequences of the explosion and other branches (Saleh et al.,
2013).
For our purposes, we will note more generally that an accident sequence can be
represented by the concatenation of a series of events (denoted by the letter “e”), starting
from an off nominal initiating event (denoted by “IE”) and leading to an accident (denoted
by “A”), as shown in Eq. 1 and Figure 2. Each event “e” presents two subscripts: the first
one identifies its position inside the string s, while the second one identifies the initiating
event. Event e2,1 defines an event that appears as a second link in a string s and that follows
the initiating event IE1. Notice that more accidents correspond to each initiating event, and
that different initiating events can lead to the same accident unfolding. For simplicity, in
Figure 2 we numerated the accidents starting from the top one as A1. The string s also has
two subscripts; the first corresponds to the initiating event, and the second to the final
accident state. For example, Eq. 1 shows the accidents sequence represented by the string
s1,k, which starts with the initiating event IE1 and terminated in the accident state Ak:
(1)

s1,k = IE1e2,1e3,1...en,1 Ak
e3,1'

en,1'

A1'

e2,1'

Ini0a0ng'
event'
IE1'

Accident'
A1'

Accident'
A2'
IE2'

System'states'

IEj'
Accident'
Ak'

Nominal'opera0ons'

Oﬀ3nominal'opera0ons,'system'states'

Figure 2. Illustrative example of the concept of accident sequence, with propagation of initiating events
to accident states (Saleh et al., 2013)
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For simplicity, we will occasionally drop the second subscript of an event e, and only
index it with respect to its position in a given string as ei (the ith event in an accident
sequence).
Equation 1 is based on the mathematical framework of Discrete Event System (DES). The
specifics are not relevant for our purposes (for details, see for example Cassandras and
Lafortune, 2008). The important point is the way in which an accident sequence can be
represented, namely as a string (denoted by the letter “s”) of events and with multiple
possible paths between different initiating events and accident states.
The conditional probability of accident Ak occurring given the occurrence of the initiating
event IEi can be written as follows:
(2)

p ( Ak | IEi )

This conditional probability is the sum over all paths starting from IEi and leading to Ak. At
a local level, given that an accident sequence has been initiated, the conditional probability
that it will further advance or escalate is expressed as follows:

(3a)

p ( ei+1 | ei )

Or more generally:
p ( ek | ei )

for k > i

(3b)
The idea of an accident sequence and the conditional probabilities associated with its
escalation can help define or intuitively convey the notion of hazard level (H). Intuitively,
the hazard level can be conceived of as the closeness of an accident to being released
(Saleh et al. 2014). It is thus related to the extent an accident sequence has advanced: the
further the sequence has escalated, the more hazardous the situation is. For example, using
Eq. 1 and Figure 2, we can note:
H ( IE1e2,1e3,1e4,1 ) > H ( IE1e2,1 )

(4)

For the situation in the left-hand side of Eq. 4, more adverse conditions are aligned and
more events in the accident sequence have occurred than the situation in the right-hand
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side. The left-hand hazard level in the system or plant is thus higher and the accident is
closer to being released. Figure 3 shows a typical example of a relation between an
accident sequence and the dynamics of hazard escalation. In this case, only one string and
one outcome are shown (a generic accident A).

A
e9

Hazard%level%

e7

e8

e6

e5
e4

IE1

e1

e2

e3

Time%

Figure 3. Illustrative example of an accident sequence and hazard level escalation over time

The operation of a hazardous process or system involves the management and handling of
the dynamics of its hazard level. The dynamics of hazard escalation can be both time
driven and event driven, and all else being equal, the hazard level scales with the extent of
potential adverse consequences (PAC). We indicate this functional dependency as follows:
H = H (t, e, PAC )

(5)

The conditional probabilities previously mentioned can also be added to the expression in
Eq. 5. They are in its current form implicit in the string of events (e) of an accident
sequence. Note that the potential adverse consequences are a function of both the amount
of energy involved or being handled, and the extent of vulnerable resources in its
neighborhood (people and structures). For example, a chemical plant in the middle of a
densely populated city has a higher potential for adverse consequences than if it were sited
in a remote industrial zone.
These concepts, accident sequence, conditional probabilities of sequence escalation, and
hazard level, will be referred to next when discussing the safety principles. They will help
12

us illustrate for example the effects of these principles on the advancement of an accident
sequence and on the dynamics of hazard escalation, as we will see shortly.
3.2 The fail-safe safety principle
Consider a function performed or implemented by a particular item in a system. The failure
of this item or disruption/termination of its function can propagate and affect the system in
different ways. For example it can lead to a cascading failure (domino effect), which would
result in a complete system failure or accident (e.g., nodes in an electric power grids
operating at maximum capacity). It can also remain confined to the neighborhood of the
failed item and have a limited impact at the system level.
The fail-safe principle imposes, or is defined by, one particular solution to the problem of
how a local failure affects the system level hazard. Specifically, the fail–safe principle
requires that the failure of an item in a system or disruption/termination of its function
should result in operational conditions that (i) block an accident sequence from further
advancing, and/or (ii) freeze the dynamics of hazard escalation in the system, thus
preventing potential harm or damage.
In light of the concepts introduced in subsection 3.1, the effects of the fail-safe principle
can be expressed as follows:

e f : failure of the item/function of interest at time te f
# ∂H
= 0 for t > te f
%
% ∂t
$ and
%
% p ( e f +k | e f ) = 0 e f +k ∈ s following e f
&

(6)

Eq. 6 expresses the fact that the dynamics of hazard escalation are frozen after the failure
of the item/function, and the accident sequence is blocked (see Fig. 4).
Conversely, if the fail-safe principle is not implemented, the item’s failure, or termination
of the function it performs, would aggravate a situation by further escalating its level of
hazard, thus initiating an accident sequence or leading to an accident, as shown in Figure 4.
For example, air brakes on trains and trucks are maintained in the open position by
pressure in the lines; should the pressure drop because of leakage or any other failure
mechanism, the brakes will be applied. A similar mechanism exists in elevators: a spring
force activated electrically holds the brakes in the open position. In the event of a power
13

failure, the brakes automatically engage. The difference between the brakes failing in the
open position and leading to the free-fall of the elevator, and the brakes failing in the
engaged position thus preventing a hazardous situation from unfolding, is the result of a
creative implementation of the fail-safe principle in this particular situation. Popular legend
notwithstanding, the only accidents involving elevators falling have occurred when the
building itself has been catastrophically damaged (Paumgarten, 2008).

Local&failure&or&disrup/on&
(failure)of)component)i"
or)termina0on/disrup0on)of)its)func0on))

System&response&&
(propaga0on)and)poten0al)
consequences)at)the)system)level))
Hazard&
level&

With%
Fail)Safe%

State&

Accident)

Accident)
triggering)
threshold)
Nominal)
condi0on)

Opera=
0onal)

tef"
Hazard&
level&

Failed)

tef"

/me&

/me&

Accident)

Accident)
triggering)
threshold)

Without%
Fail)Safe%

Nominal)
condi0on)

tef"

/me&

Figure 4. Illustrative comparison of system behavior over time following a local failure, both with the
implementation of the fail-safe principle and without it (tef is the time of occurrence of the failure of the
component/function of interest)

Another example of the implementation of the fail-safe principle is the “dead man’s
switch” for train operators: should they fall asleep or become unconscious, the device is no
longer held down, and as a result the brakes are applied. A similar device is used in
chainsaws, snowmobiles, jet skis, and during aircraft refueling (the activity is stopped).
More complex implementations of the fail-safe principle can be found in nuclear reactors
where self-shutdown is initiated if critical operating conditions are reached. While the
details are not relevant for our discussion, the important idea is that the fail-safe principle
14

can be implemented in a variety of ways and it requires engineering creativity and
technical ingenuity to conceive and implement in various contexts (e.g., the US patent and
trademark office lists more than 20,000 patents proposing various fail-safe mechanisms6).
One final comment about this principle: while there may be situations or items for which
the fail-safe principle is incompatible with their design or is simply not implementable, it is
nevertheless important that this principle always be considered and carefully assessed in
any design endeavor before it is ruled out.
3.3 The safety margins (or safety reserves) principle
The adoption of safety margins is a common practice in civil engineering where structures
are designed with a safety factor to account for larger loads than what they are expected to
sustain, or weaker structural strength than usual due to various uncertainties. The
importance of safety margins for structures such as bridges and levees, which have to cope
with the uncertainty of operational and environmental conditions such as wind force and
wave height, is easy to understand. We propose that the idea of safety margins in civil
engineering is an instantiation of a broader safety principle, which we will refer to by the
same name. The safety margin principle extends beyond civil engineering and is more
diverse in its implementation than the particular form it takes for structures. In other
words, safety margins can take multiple forms and be adopted in a variety of contexts, as
we will see shortly.
The safety margin principle has a simple form and is intuitively understood. It requires first
an estimation of a critical hazard threshold for accident occurrence, Ĥ critical , and an
understanding of the dynamics of hazard escalation in a particular situation. For example,
methane in coalmines enters an “explosive range” when its concentration in the mine
atmosphere reaches between 5% and 15% (Saleh and Cummings, 2011). Reaching the 5%
threshold for example can be considered a critical hazard threshold in the mine.
The safety margin principle requires that features be put in place to maintain the
operational conditions and the associated hazard level at some “distance” away from the
estimated critical hazard threshold or accident-triggering threshold. This distance or norm
is the general form of a safety margin (sm), and it can be expressed as follows:
(7a)

Ĥ critical − H op (t ) ≥ sm
or in relative terms:
6

U.S. Patent and Trademark office, full-text and image database after 1976, at
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html [accessed May 7, 2013]
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Ĥ critical − H op (t )
Ĥ critical

≥ sm%
(7b)

or
H op (t ) ≤

Ĥ critical
1+ sm%

For instance, in the coal mine example, a safety margin can be established with respect to
the risk of methane explosion by maintaining methane concentration below say 3% in the
mine atmosphere, 2 percentage points below the critical hazard level. The difference
between the operational upper limit and the boundary of the explosive range, the triggering
threshold, is a particular form of safety margin in this context. This safety margin can be
established through reliable methane monitoring throughout the mine, and most
importantly through proper ventilation. Unfortunately, most mine explosions worldwide
are the direct result of a violation of this basic safety principle or its flawed implementation
(Saleh and Cummings, 2011).
In a different context, pressure safety valves are another form of implementation of the
safety margin principle in the oil and gas and chemical industries. If Pcrit is the critical
pressure beyond which the structural integrity of a containment vessel is compromised, the
safety relief valve is triggered when the inequality below is reached:

P(t) ≤

Pcrit
1+ sm%

(8)

The purpose of the valve is to maintain the pressure in the vessel at some distance away
from the accident-triggering pressure threshold. The accident in this case would be loss of
containment, which might result in fire, explosion, and/or release of toxic material into the
environment.
Figure 5 provides a visual representation of the safety margins principle.
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Figure 5. Illustration of the safety margins principle with a sample accident trajectory from a nominal
operating condition to an accident. A larger margin makes it more likely that the system state will not
reach the accident-triggering threshold, or that a longer time window is available to detect a system
state that has crossed the operational upper limit (for nominal conditions) and abate the hazardous
situation before an accident is triggered.

The justification for this principle is best understood in light of the argument put forth by
Möller and Hansson (2008) as discussed in subsection 2.2, namely that one objective of all
safety principles is the reduction in uncertainty about the occurrence of an adverse event
(both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties). In the case of the safety margins principle,
notice that Ĥ critical is the estimated critical hazard threshold or accident-triggering
threshold. The actual threshold is unknown or best modeled as a random variable. Safety
margins are one way for coping with uncertainties in both the critical hazard threshold and
in our ability to manage the operational conditions in a system such that their associated
hazard level Hop(t) does not intersect with the real but unknown H critical .
Finally, we note that as with the fail-safe principle, the safety margins principle can also be
implemented in a variety of ways and it requires creativity and technical ingenuity to
conceive and design in different contexts and for handling different types of hazards. It is
also important to carefully assess the trade-offs before corners are cut and safety margins
are shrunk.
3.4 The un-graduated response principle: rules of engagements with hazards
The use of force in a military or law enforcement context is governed by a set of Rules of
Engagements or Rules for the Use of Force (CJCSI, 2005). The principal tenet of these
rules is that of a graduated response, namely that if force is deemed necessary, it ought to

17

be applied gradually in relation to the extent of a demonstrated belligerence, as a last
resort, and only the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission should be used.
The opposite of this tenet holds for dealing with safety issues, and the corresponding
principle we refer to as the un-graduated response or rules of engagements with
technological hazards. This principle for accident prevention and mitigation articulates a
hierarchy of preferences for safety interventions.
The un-graduated response principle is closely related to and overlaps with other safety
principles, especially defense-in-depth discussed next. But it is worth examining separately
as it articulates an important safety idea in a novel and forceful way. Given that the
objective of the present work is mainly educational (to be used in safety training and
education), examining this idea from different perspectives for emphasis is worthwhile.
Kill first: The un-graduated response principle posits that the first course of action to
explore for accident prevention and mitigation is the possibility of eliminating a hazard all
together. We refer to this attitude as “kill first” or use creativity and technical ingenuity as
a first resort to eliminate the hazard, regardless of the extent of its belligerence (lethal use
of force against hazards).
For example, many precautions can be taken when transporting hazardous materials, such
as the use of thicker and sturdier containers. But eliminating the hazard all together instead
of better containing it, by transporting a safer substitute for example ought to be the first
course of action to consider and examine for feasibility. Similarly if a heat source or
electric wires are in the vicinity of flammable material, the hazard can be controlled or the
probability of an accident reduced by using proper wire isolation and placing the wires
within fireproof protective jackets. But this particular hazard, the co-location of the electric
wires and flammable material, can be eliminated by re-routing the wires through another
location—the preferred course of action by virtue of this safety principle.
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Figure 6. Illustration of the hierarchy of preferences for safety interventions by virtue of the ungraduated response principle (not to be considered with an exclusive or)

Next, if the hazard cannot be eliminated, the second course of action is to control it or
reduce its likelihood of escalating into an accident. Figuratively, if “kill first” is not
feasible, then proceed to “apprehend and restrain”. A third and concurrent course of action
is to devise ways to mitigate the consequences or minimize the damage should the hazard
escalate into an accident (Figure 6). We revisit these issues in more details when we
discuss the defense-in-depth safety principle next. Notice that the un-graduated response
principle covers the general idea in Kletz’ inherent safety principle discussed previously,
and the “safety by design” concept (Bollinger, 1996; Khan and Amyotte, 2003; Kletz and
Amyotte, 2010).
3.5 The defense-in-depth principle
Defense-in-depth is a fundamental safety principle and one whose importance cannot be
underestimated. We believe this principle should be central to the education of all
engineers and anyone interested in system safety issues.
This principle targets all the elements of an accident sequence (Eq. 1), and it intervenes
with all the arguments of the hazard level function (Eq. 5), as we will see shortly.
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Defense-in-depth derives from a long tradition in warfare by virtue of which important
positions were protected by multiple lines of defenses (e.g., moat, outer wall, inner wall).
First conceptualized in the nuclear industry, defense-in-depth became the basis for riskinformed decisions by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, 2000; Sørensen et
al., 1999-2000), and it is adopted under various names in other industries. Defense-indepth has several pillars:
i.

Multiple lines of defenses or safety barriers should be placed along
potential accident sequences;

ii.

Safety should not rely on a single defensive element (hence the “depth”
qualifier in defense-in-depth);

iii.

The successive barriers should be diverse in nature and include technical,
operational, and organizational safety barriers. In other words, defense-indepth should not be conceived of as implemented only through physical
defenses.

The various safety barriers have different objectives and perform different functions. The
first set of barriers, or line of defense, is meant to prevent an accident sequence from
initiating. In light of the previous discussion of an accident sequence (subsection 3.1), the
first line of defense implies that safety features are devised and put in place such that the
probability of an accident-initiating event (IE) is minimized:

min !" p ( IEi )#$

(9)

Should this first line of defense fail in its prevention function, a second set of safety
defenses should be in place to block the accident sequence from further escalating:

min !" p ( ei+k | ei )#$

∀i, k

for

ei ∈ s

and ei+k ∈ s

following ei

(10)

Finally should the first and second lines of defense fail, a third set of safety defenses
should be in place to contain the accident and mitigate its consequences. This third line
of defense is designed and put in place based on the assumption that the accident will
occur, but its potential adverse consequences (PAC) should be minimized. Lifeboats are
one illustration of this third line of defense. The objective of the third line of defense can
be expressed as follows:
min ( PAC | A)

(11)
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These three lines of defenses constitute defense-in-depth and its three functions,
namely (i) prevention, (ii) blocking further hazardous escalation, and (ii) containing
the damage or mitigating the potential consequences. Figure 7 illustrates this safety
principle, along with a particular accident sequence.
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Figure 7. Illustration of the defense-in-depth safety principle, along with a hypothetical accident
sequence (its occurrence is the result of the absence, inadequacy, or breach of various safety barriers)

Accidents typically result from the absence, inadequacy, or breach of defenses, or the
violation of safety constraints, as illustrated in Figure 7 (Rasmussen, 1997; Svedung and
Rasmussen, 2002; Leveson, 2004). It is interesting to note that the U.S. Department of
Energy defines an accident as an “unwanted transfer [or release] of energy that, due to the
absence or failure of barriers and controls, produces injury to persons [or] damage to
property” (DOE, 1997). This view is related Haddon’s energy basis of accidents and
injuries, and it provides a useful bridge between defense-in-depth and Haddon’s safety
strategies discussed in subsection 2.2. The understanding of defense-in-depth can thus be
expanded and this principle be viewed as functioning to prevent, contain, and limit
unwanted releases of energy.
The notion of a safety barrier is the embodiment of the “defense” part of defense-in-depth
in the sense that defenses are realized through barriers deliberately inserted along potential
accident sequences and prior to their initiating events.
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It can be seen that the previous safety principles overlap to some extent with defense-indepth. For example, the implementation of a fail-safe mechanism, or the establishment of a
safety margin, can be considered as different forms of barriers in the layout of defense-indepth. And the un-graduated response principle reflects to some extent the different
functions of the multiple lines of defenses (their “depthness”). This overlap is useful, and it
provides us with an opportunity to emphasize certain foundational ideas in safety
education.
Finally, as with the previous safety principles, defense-in-depth can be implemented in
many ways and it requires significant ingenuity—technical, operational, organizational,
and regulatory—to conceive and implement in a variety of contexts and for dealing with
different types of hazards and uncertainties.
3.6 The observability-in-depth principle
Observability-in-depth plays a distinctive role in system safety, and it contributes to
accident prevention in a fundamentally different way than the previous principles, as we
will discuss shortly. Observability-in-depth brings an online real-time mindset to accident
prevention (i.e., during system operation)—an aspect that was either missing or not
explicitly recognized in the previous principles. Unlike defense-in-depth and its relation to
the energy model of accidents, observability-in-depth is fundamentally an informationcentric principle, and its importance in accident prevention is in the value of the
information it provides and actions or safety interventions it spurs, as we will see shortly.
Observability-in-depth does not affect or intervene directly in an accident sequence, unlike
the previous principles, but it scans for accident pathogens and monitors for hazard
escalation and advancement of accident sequences. Its importance cannot be
underestimated, and its significance is best motivated by first considering situations in
which this principle was NOT implemented. Violations of the observability-in-depth
principle highlight not the causal chain of an accident sequence—why the accident
happened—but the causal factors that failed to support accident prevention—why blocking
the accident sequence did not happen.
There are several mechanisms in the design of complex systems that can contribute to
concealing the occurrence of hazardous events (e.g., redundant component failures or
build-up of accident pathogens/latent failures) and the transition of the system to an
increasingly hazardous state, which make “systems more […] opaque to the people who
manage and operate them” (Reason, 1997). As a result, system operators may be left blind
to the possibility that hazard escalation is occurring, thus decreasing their situational
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awareness and shortening the time they have to intervene before an accident is released. In
other words, these safety blind spots translate into a shrinking of the time window
available for operators to identify an unfolding hazardous situation and intervene to abate
it. Several accident reports identified hidden failures and unobservable accidents pathogens
as important contributing factors to the accidents, the Three Mile Island and the Texas City
refinery accidents being representative cases (Hopkins, 2001; Saleh et al., 2013).
To visually illustrate this argument, consider the situation represented in Figure 8. This is
similar to the dynamics of hazard level and accident sequence represented previously in
Figure 3, except we now distinguish between the actual hazard level, H(t), and the
estimated or assumed hazard level, Ĥ (t) .

Figure 8. Hazard escalation over time and the violation of the observability-in-depth principle
(Saleh et al., 2014). The figure shows how underestimating the actual hazard level (ovals) can
lead to an accident occurring seemingly without warning (rectangles). The gap between the
these two quantities (D) represents a loss of situational awareness and can result in the
operators making flawed decisions or not taking a needed safety action, which in turn can
compromise the safe operation of the system or fail to check the escalation of an accident
sequence.

Roughly speaking, operators make decisions during system operation, which are based on
and affect the hazard level in a system. If the system conditions/states are not carefully
monitored and reliably reported, there is a distinct possibility that the hazard level
estimated by the operators will diverge from the actual hazard level reached by the system:
(12)

ΔH ≡ Ĥ − H (t )
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The gap between these two quantities (Eq. 12) can result in the operators making flawed
decisions, which in turn can compromise the safe operation of the system or fail to check
the escalation of an accident sequence (e.g., no action when an intervention is warranted).
The Three Mile Island and the Texas City refinery accidents as noted previously are
examples of such situations. Details of these accidents and other similar cases can be found
in (Saleh et al., 2014; Favarò and Saleh, 2013).
The discussion so far has considered, as a way of motivating the observability-in-depth
principle, the safety implications when this principle is not implemented. We are now
ready to examine this principle and its objectives.
Observability-in-depth is characterized by the set of provisions, technical (by design) and
operational, designed to enable the monitoring and identification of emerging hazardous
conditions and accident pathogens. Observability-in-depth requires that all safetydegrading events or states that safety barriers are meant to protect against be observable. It
implies that various features be put in place to observe and monitor for the system state
and breaches of any safety barrier, and reliably provide this feedback to the operators
(Bakolas and Saleh, 2011; Favarò and Saleh, 2013). In light of Figure 8 and Eq. (12), it can
be said that observability-in-depth seeks (i) to minimize the gap between the actual and the
estimated hazard levels, and (ii) to ensure that at the hazard levels associated with the
breaching of various safety barriers, H1, H2, and H3 in the figure, the two curves (actual
and estimated) coincide7. This concept can be expressed as follows:

e bi : breach of safety barrier bi
(13)

%min ΔH ⇔ min Ĥ − H (t )
''
& and
'ΔH = 0
∀i
'( bi
The depth qualifier in observability-in-depth has both a causal and a temporal dimension,
and it characterizes the ability to identify adverse states and conditions far upstream (early)
in an accident sequence (see Eq. 1). It also reflects the ability to observe emerging accident
pathogens and latent failures before their effect becomes manifest on the system’s output
or behavior, or before an increasingly hazardous transition occurs in an accident sequence.
To illustrate this point, consider Figure 9, which represents a set of safety barriers and
7

Observability-in-depth echoes the old Russian say, “trust but verify”. If the previous safety principles are
meant to build (some) trust in the safe operation of a system, observability-in-depth is concerned with the
“verify” part.
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various hazardous states. Each hazardous transition/escalation in an accident sequence has
a set of underlying causes; Figure 9 includes only one such set for readability purposes, the
underlying causes of a transition from Si to Sj in the form of a Fault Tree.

Figure 9. Illustration of the Observability-in-Depth principle. The figure shows (i) above the
time axis the manifestation of the accident sequence and escalation of the hazard level as
safety barriers are breached, and (ii) below the time axis the causal basis (why) of hazardous
state transition. The “depthness” of observability (the two arrows in the figure) characterizes
both the ability to see breaches of safety barriers and to identify accident pathogens (deeply
buried) in the causal basis of a hazardous transition (before their effect is manifest on the
system’s output or behaviour).

The condition Pi in the fault tree is a latent failure or accident pathogen (Saleh et al., 2013);
it does not have a visible effect on the system behaviour or operation until the second
condition in its AND gate occurs. If the system reaches state Si, the hazardous transition to
Sj will occur, thus further advancing the accident sequence. The ability to observe such
causal factors or accident pathogens in an accident sequence before they have a visible
effect on the system operation is one measure of the depthness of observability. The other
measure is that no line of defense should conceal the fact that the system has breached any
one safety barrier and has reached a hazardous state the engineers and system designers
meant to protect against.
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Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) has traditionally been performed offline and used as a
static tool to help identify and prioritize various risks before the system is in operation.
Observability-in-depth introduces an online (real-time) mindset into risk analysis and
management, and it supports the development of a “living” or online quantitative risk
assessment. Further, it is worth clarifying that observability-in-depth is an important
complement to defense-in-depth: the former prevents the latter from devolve into a
defense-blind safety strategy, and the latter along with PRA, guide the establishment of
provisions for monitoring safety functions and barriers. In short, observability-in-depth can
help conceive of a dynamic defense-in-depth safety strategy in which some defensive
resources, safety barriers and others, are prioritized and allocated dynamically in response
to emerging risks (Bakolas and Saleh, 2011; Favarò and Saleh, 2013).
Finally, we note that, as with all the previous safety principles, observability-in-depth can
be implemented in many ways, and it requires technical ingenuity to design and implement
in a variety of contexts and for monitoring different types of hazards and states of safety
barriers. As a final remark, the general approaches to fault detection and diagnosis in
dynamical systems (Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003a, b, c) are subsumed under this
principle and they constitute in some case specific forms of implementation of this
principle (tactics).
4. Conclusion
As noted in the Introduction, risk analysis has been described as addressing three main
questions:
(1) What can go wrong?
(2) How likely it is?
(3) What would be the consequences?
The safety principles examined in this work provide guidelines and conceptual support
during system design and operation for addressing the most important follow-up question,
namely:
(4) What are you going to do about it [what can go wrong]? Or how are you going to
defend against it?
The observability-in-depth principle was distinctive in that it addressed the real-time
version of the first question of risk analysis:
(Real-time mindset) What is going wrong, if anything? And how will you know it is
happening?
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The high-level safety principles discussed in this work, fail-safe, safety margins, ungraduated response, defense- and observability-in-depth, are domain-independent,
technologically agnostic, and broadly applicable across industries. While no claim to
exhaustiveness is made, we believe many detailed safety measures (tactics) derive from or
relate to these principles. The translation of these safety principles into specific design
features and safety measures requires, as was emphasized throughout this work, detailed
knowledge of the system under consideration as well as creativity and technical ingenuity
to conceive and implement in various context and for handling different risks.
We also related the safety principles examined in this work to the notions of hazard level,
accident sequence, and conditional probabilities of further hazard escalation or
advancement of an accident sequence. These notions helped us better illuminate the
purpose and consequences of these principles. The principles were also related to the
energy model of accidents (Haddon’s contribution) and the broadly known “inherent safety
principle” in the chemical industry (Kletz’s contribution).
The main purpose of this work, as noted in the Introduction, is educational and it is meant
to serve a useful role in safety training and education. We believe these principles are a
useful addition to the intellectual toolkit of engineers, decision-makers, and anyone
interested in safety issues, and they can provide helpful guidelines during system design
and risk management efforts. Subsequent courses or safety training can build on this basis
and examine detailed measures in the specific industry of interest to different audiences.
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